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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

*

Case No. 950361

*
*
*
*

v.
TINA JACKSON and
KELLY NORTON,

*

Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals by Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2d).

This is an appeal from a

final judgment on the defendants' Motion For Relief From Judgment.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
Plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to a "Landlords") brought
suit against pro se defendants (herein referred to as "Tenants") in
unlawful detainer.

Trial in the Second Circuit Court in Ogden,

Utah, was held on January 18, 1995.

Judge Heffernan ordered

tenants to immediately vacate the leased property and to leave all
their personal property at the rented premises.

The court relied

upon the following lease term in concluding that tenants would not
be allowed to remove their property from the leased premises:
"Furniture, fixtures and personal property of the tenant may not be
removed from the premises until rent or other charges are fully
paid."

After a hearing dated January 27, 1995, tenants were
1

permitted to retrieve a small portion of their personal property.
On March 17, 1995, tenants filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment
seeking the return of their property. The trial court denied this
motion and this appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the trial court commit error by refusing to set aside its
order and by enforcing a lease term which conflicts with state law,
Utah Code §§ 38-3-1, 78-23-5, 8 and 78-36-10.5 and deprives tenants
of their property?

The standard of review is abuse of discretion.

Udv v. Udv, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code § 38-3-1
Utah Code § 78-23-5 and 8
Utah Code § 78-36-10.5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. NATURE OF THE CASE: This case began as an action for unlawful
detainer. The court's order of restitution precluded tenants from
removing their personal property. This appeal concerns the manner
of execution of the order of restitution.
b. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:

This action was commenced by the

landlords in the Second Circuit Court of Weber County, Ogden City
Department, on December 12, 1994.
filed a pro se answer.

On December 19, 1994, tenants

On January 18f 1995, a trial was held and

judgment awarded to landlrods for restoration of the premises. On
January 19, 1995, tenants filed a motion for an immediate hearing.
A hearing was held on January 27, 1995, and the court issued an
2

amended judgment on January 27, 1995. On March 17, 1995, tenants
filed a motion for relief from judgment which was denied on April
21, 1995. This appeal was filed May 19, 1995.
c. DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT:

The court ordered tenants to

vacate the premises immediately and ordered them not to remove any
personal items without paying all past due rent.
d. RELEVANT FACTS:
1.

Tenants rented an apartment from landlords. On December

12, 1994, landlords filed a complaint for eviction

(Unlawful

Detainer), alleging non-payment of rent. (R. 001) On December 19,
1994, tenants filed a pro se answer.
2.

(R. Oil)

At a January 18, 1995 hearing, the circuit court ordered

tenants and their four minor children, ages 3, 6, 7 and 7, to
immediately vacate the leased property and to leave their personal
property.

(R. 017) The court relied upon the following lease

paragraph: "Furniture, fixtures and personal property of the tenant
may not be removed from the premises until rent or other charges
are fully paid." (R. 022)
3.

No writ of restitution was served upon tenants.

4.

No sheriff or constable inventoried tenants' personal

property or stored it.
5.

After the January 20 order was issued, landlords refused

to release personal property and prescriptive medicine belonging to
tenants' minor children.

3

6.

By order of January 27, 1995, the court amended its prior

order and permitted tenants to retrieve a small portion of the
personal property belonging to their minor children.
7.

(R. 018)

By written notice on February 21, 1995, tenants requested

that landlords relinquish their personal property, pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-36-10.5(4)(b)(i). (R. 021)
8.

Landlords refused to release any property.

9.

On April 21, 1995, the court denied

tenants' motion for

relief from judgment ruling that " . . . the contract provisions
regarding tenants' property shall apply. . . . " (R. 024) Landlords
still hold tenants' property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in refusing to set aside its order which
ignored state laws on exempt property and eviction procedures and
which

allowed

landlords

to keep

tenants' property

after

an

eviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE
ITS ORDER AND BY ENFORCING A LEASE TERM, EVEN THOUGH
ENFORCEMENT WAS CONTRARY TO UTAH CODE §§ 38-3-1, 78-23-5,
8 AND 78-36-10.5Tenants contend that the trial court erred by refusing to set
aside its order which violated Utah statutes defining exempt
property and providing for the release of a tenant's property after
eviction.

Specifically, the tenants claim that the lease term

4

prohibiting property removal until rent obligations are satisfied,
which the court relied on in its order, conflicts with Utah Code §§
38-3-1, 78-23-5 and 8 and 78-36-10.5.
The

court's failure to comply with the above statutes has

resulted in tenants being unable to retrieve their household
belongings, including beds, mattresses, box springs, appliances,
microwave oven, food processor, toasters, bicycles,

clothing,

papers and other personal items. By enforcing this unlawful lease
term and elevating it above state law, the court has authorized the
landlord to convert tenants' property to their own use and made
such self help "lawful", disregarding the policy behind Utah's
unlawful detainer statute, exempt property statute and statutory
restitution procedure.
The Utah Supreme Court has applied contract law to landlordtenant cases for more then a decade.

In the case of Wade v. Jobe,

818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991), for example, the Utah Supreme
Court stated " . . . this court has conformed the common law in this
state

to

contemporary

conditions

by

rejecting

the

strict

application of traditional property law to residential leases,
recognizing that it is often more appropriate to apply contract
law."

Other

cases

supporting

the

application

of

contract

principles in the interpretation of a lease include:

Reid v.

Mutual of Omaha Ins Co. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989; Williams v. Melbv,
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); and Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah
1981).

5

And under contract law, private parties may not by agreement
or rule render ineffective rules and standards provided by statute.
The clause here should have been declared void, not enforced.

In

People in Matter of K.M.K. , 780 P.2d 43 (Colo.App 1989), for
example, an attorney and her client agreed the attorney would be
compensated at $140 per hour for adoption services and $60 per hour
for paralegal services.
service was $4,933.43.

The total cost billed for the legal
The trial court, looking to the Colorado

Childrens Code, ruled an attorney could charge reasonable fees, but
only those fees " . . . customarily performed by such persons." The
trial court held, and the Colorado appellate court affirmed, that
attorneys could not exceed the customary fee of $2000.

In so

ruling, the court concluded that an attorney/client contract is
valid and enforceable provided it does not conflict with state
statutes. Since that contract clause did conflict, it was declared
void, as the agreement conflicted with existing customary fee
provisions of the Colorado Childrens Code.
In Gonzalez v. Industrial Commission of State, 740 P.2d 999,
1002 (Colo. 1987), the court reached a similar result.

In that

case, employer guidelines determined eligibility for unemployment
benefits. The court ruled " . . . the determination of eligibility
for

unemployment

compensation

benefits

and

of

standards

of

disqualification are matters within the province of the General
Assembly . . . Private parties may not by agreement or rules render
ineffectual the rules and standards provided by statute." Again,
the statute predominated over the private agreement.
6

The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Second, at Section
580, reaches a similar conclusion: a contract that is contrary to
the terms of a legislative enactment is illegal or unenforceable.
This policy was used in Ross v. Producers Mutual Insurance Company.
295 P.2d. 339 (Utah 1956) to void a contract provision authorizing
an insurance company to purchase stock since the stock purchase
conflicted with Utah Code § 31-27-15.
In this case, the parties agreed the tenants' personal
property would remain on the premises until rent or other charges
were paid. This lease term conflicts with Utah Code § 78-36-10.5
and should likewise be declared void.
Pursuant to the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute, Utah Code §
78-36-10.5,
Restitution,

a

landlord may,

after

issuance

of

an

Order of

obtain a Writ of Restitution, and have a sheriff or

constable serve the writ and notify the tenant to vacate and remove
their property. If they fail to do so in the time period allowed by
the court, the sheriff or constable must inventory the property and
arrange for its storage in a suitable place and in a reasonable
manner.

The statute further provides for the "prompt return" of

any personal property left behind by a vacating tenant, provided
the landlord is reimbursed for costs associated with the removal,
transportation, and storage of said property.
The court here, in enforcing the lease term, prohibited
tenants from removing their household property, thus depriving them
of their property, as well as depriving them of the statutory right
to retrieve said property. As a policy matter, "[c]ourts will not
7

enforce or aid in enforcement of a contract made in violation of
law.

..."

1992).

An-Cor, Inc. v. Rehermank, 835 P.2d 93, 96 (Okl.

The trial court should not have enforced this contractual

provision.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY
ENFORCING A SELF HELP LEASE PROVISION THAT WAS VOID AS
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
By judicially authorizing landlords to hold tenants' property,
the trial court was authorizing a self-help remedy in direct
contravention of Utah case law concerning landlord-tenant matters
and public policy. In Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States
Wholesale Supp, 451 P.2d 778, 781(Utah 1969),
Court reviewed

the Utah Supreme

the common law in England and the United States

before concluding that a lease provision which permitted the
landlord to take possession without notice or legal process if rent
had not been paid for a period of 15 days was void as against
public policy, since the forcible entry and detainer statute
provided an adequate and speedy remedy.
In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court followed Freeway.

The tenant sued because

the landlord forcibly evicted her and retained possession of her
property without resort to judicial process. The landlord admitted
he retained the personal property to secure payment of rent, much
like the present case.

The court concluded the following:

The Code gives a landlord a lien on a lessee's non-exempt
property for rent due. However , to secure physical attachment
of the property he must resort to the courts. A writ of
attachment must be sought and can be obtained only upon the
8

filing of an action against the tenant. . . .
A bond must
also be filed. . . . Absent compliance with the Code, seizing
a tenant's property by self-help is a civil wrong and is
actionable as a tort. . . . Self-help is too likely to lead
to a breach of the peace to be permitted, and contractual
provisions purporting to authorize it will be void as against
public policy."
The same principles apply in this case. The landlords relied upon
and the court accepted just such a contractual provision purporting
to authorize self help conversion of the tenants' property . By
prohibiting tenants

from taking possession of their personal

property, the trial court sanctioned the same behavior condemned in
Freeway Park Building and Pentecost.

The court disregarded this

clear and binding case law in permitting the landlord to hold
tenants' property.
POINT III,
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY
FAILING TO ORDER THE LANDLORD TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF
UTAH CODE, § 78-36-10.5.
The 1994 Utah legislature enacted legislation effective on May
2, 1994 that established the only procedure to be used in enforcing
judgments in unlawful detainer and in forcible entry and detainer
cases.

In summary, Utah Code § 78-36-10.5

requires the tenant to

vacate and remove personal property if the court rules in favor of
the landlord. The tenant must be notified of their right to a
hearing and given a hearing request form.

If the tenant does not

vacate voluntarily, a sheriff or constable must inventory the
property, arrange for storage and provide a means for its return
upon payment of reasonable costs. The statute does not allow

9

landlords to permanently keep tenants' property, particularly
property exempt by law.
The order of restitution issued by the trial court (R. 017)
here simply ignored this statute and the procedure it established
and denied the tenants their rights guaranteed by law. The defects
in the procedure here included:1
a) the order prohibited the tenants from removing their
personal property;
b) the defendants were not served with a writ of
restitution;
c) no sheriff or constable was involved in the
enforcement of the restitution order;
d) the tenants were not advised of their right to a hearing,
nor was a hearing request form provided;
e) the sheriff or constable did not transport the property to
a suitable safe storage facility;
f) the sheriff
personal property;

or constable did not inventory the tenants'

g) the sheriff or constable could not return, upon fee
payment, the personal property within 30 days of property removal.
All of these errors make the court's refusal to set aside its
judgment and order of restitution even more egregious. Here the
landlord, with the help and sanction of the court, failed to follow
the clearly articulated statutory procedures for eviction, in
blatant disregard of the newly passed law.

x

The statute in its entirety is included in the addendum, at

A-3.
10

POINT IV,
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY
ORDERING THE LANDLORD TO TAKE POSSESSION OF TENANTS'
PERSONAL PROPERTY WITHOUT OBTAINING A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT
OR OTHER APPROPRIATE ORDER.
Under Utah law, all non-exempt property of a tenant kept or
brought upon leased property is subject to a lien for rent due.
Utah Code § 38-3-1.

This is the lessor's lien.

lien attaches immediately.

This statutory

However, this does not give the

landlord any right to possession of such property.

The lien only

allows a landlord to have a tenant's nonexempt property seized
under a writ of attachment by an officer and held pending a
determination of the priorities of the claims, liens, and security
interests in such property.

The writ of attachment cannot be

obtained without the filing of an appropriate affidavit and the
posting of a bond in an amount double the alleged damages.
The court, by prohibiting the tenants from removing their
personal property, disregarded the lessors' lien provisions of the
Utah Code, in essence granted a possessory lien without compliance
with the statute and provided the landlord with a remedy not
authorized by statute, namely retaining the tenants' personal
property without complying with the statute. This is bad policy.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY
PERMITTING THE LANDLORD TO TAKE POSSESSION OF TENANTS'
PERSONAL PROPERTY SINCE IT IS EXEMPT FROM ATTACHMENT.
In addition to the foregoing, the court violated the tenants'
rights under the Utah exemption statute which precludes the seizure
of certain property even if a valid writ of attachment or execution
11

is issued.
statute

Even if a tenant owes money to the landlord, this

recognizes

possessions.

Utah

the
Code

importance
§

78-23-5

of
and

a
8

family's
exempt

minimal
household

furnishings and appliances as well as certain specified property.
Most if not all of tenants' property is thus exempt from seizure.
And Utah Code § 78-23-11 precludes waiver of these rights.
By upholding such a waiver of exemption rights and then
authorizing landlord to seize and hold all of tenants' property,
exempt and non-exempt, the court permitted the landlords to break
the law.

Ironically, the court, in attempting to protect the

rights of the prevailing party, disregarded minimal statutory
protections to this low income family.
CONCLUSION
The trial court enforced a contract provision that authorized
the landlord to withhold possession of the tenants' personal
property. In so doing, the court disregarded Utah law and case law
and permitted a "self help" lease clause to supersede statutory
authority.
The decision below should be reversed and the portion of the
judgment concerning tenants' property set aside.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fjs*?

day of August 1995.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

By:
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code § 38-3-1, et seq.

Page A-l

Utah Code § 78-23-5, 8 and 11

Page A-2

Utah Code § 78-36-10.5

Page A-3

Order of Restitution

Page A-4

Decision

Page A-5

Amended Order

Page A-6

Lease

Page A-9
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38-3-1

38-3-2

LIENS

long as the lessee shall occupy said premises and for
thirty days thereafter
1853
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien.
The h e n provided for m this chapter shall be preferred to all other hens or claims except claims for
taxes and hens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this
title, perfected security interests, and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by law, provided, t h a t when a lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, or shall make a n assignment for the benefit of
creditors, or when his property shall be put into the
possession of a receiver, the h e n herein provided for
shall be limited to the rent for ninety days prior
thereto
1977
38-3-3. Attachment in aid of hen.
Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under
a lease, or t h e lessee shall be about to remove his
property from t h e leased premises, the lessor may
have the personal property of the lessee which is upon
the leased premises and subject to such h e n attached
without other ground for such attachment
1953
38-3-4. Attachment — Affidavit and bond.
The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of
attachment file a complaint, and an affidavit duly
sworn to setting forth the amount of rent due over
and above all offsets and counterclaims and a brief
description of t h e leased premises, and shall further
state, under oath that such writ of attachment is not
sued out for the purpose of vexing or harassing the
lessee, and the person applying for such writ of attachment shall execute and file a bond as in other
cases of attachment
1953
38-3-5. When attachment will issue — Determination of priorities.
Upon t h e filing of such complaint, affidavit and
bond it shall be the duty of the court wherein the
same are filed to issue a writ of attachment to the
proper officer, commanding him to seize the property
of the defendant subject to such hen, or so much
thereof as will satisfy the demand, and to make a
determination of the priorities of the claims, hens,
and security interests in such property
1977
CHAPTER 3

38-3-6 Execution of writ of attachment.
It shall be the duty of the officer to whom the writ
of attachment is directed to seize the property of such
\essee subject to such hen, or as much thereof as shaft
be necessary to satisfy such debt and costs, and to
keep the same until the determination of the action,
unless the property is sooner released by bond or the
attachment is discharged
1953

LESSORS' LIENS
Section
38-3-1
38-3-2
38-3-3
38-3-4
38-3-5
38-3-6
38-3-7
38-3-8

Lien for rent due
Priority of lessor's hen
Attachment in aid of hen
Attachment —- Affidavit and bond
When attachment will issue — Determination of priorities
Execution of writ of attachment
Release of attachment — Bond
When chapter not applicable

38-3-7. Release of attachment — Bond.
A bond for the release of the attached property may
be given, and motion to discharge the attachment
may be made, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in cases of attachment
1953

38-3-1. Lien for rent due.
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a
hen for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the
lessee brought or kept upon the leased premises so

38-3-8. When chapter not applicable.
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written
lease for a term of years in which, as part of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a
building or improvements upon the leased premises
1953

A-l

78-23-6
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution.
(1) An individual is entitled to exemption of the
following property:
(a) a burial plot for the individual and his family;
(b) health aids reasonably necessary to enable
the individual or a dependent to work or sustain
health;
(c) benefits the individual or his dependent
have received or are entitled to receive by reason
of disability, illness, or unemployment from any
source;
(d) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care to the extent they are used
by an individual or his dependent to pay for such
care;
(e) veterans benefits;
(f) money or property received, and rights to
receive money or property for child support;
(g) one clothes washer and dryer, one refrigerator, one freezer, one stove, one sewing machine,
all carpets in use, provisions sufficient for three
months actually provided for individual or family
use, all wearing apparel of every individual and
dependent, not including jewelry or furs, and all
beds and bedding for every individual or dependent;
(h) works of art depicting the debtor or the
debtor and his resident family, or produced by
the debtor or the debtor and his resident family,
except works of art held by the debtor as part of a
trade or business;
(i) proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or a settlement, or other rights accruing as a result of
bodily injury of the individual or of the wrongful
death or bodily injury of another individual of
whom the individual was or is a dependent to the
extent that such proceeds are compensatory;
(j) any money or other assets payable to the
individual as a participant or beneficiary from or
an interest of the individual as a participant or
beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement
which is described in Sections 401(a), 401(h),
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of
the United States Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended. This exemption shall not apply:
(i) to an alternate payee under a qualified
domestic relations order, as those terms are
defined in Section 414(p) of the United
States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended; or
(ii) to amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor within 180
days before the debtor files for bankruptcy;
or
(iii) to the assets of bankruptcy proceedings filed before January 1, 1989;
(k) the interest of or any money or other assets
payable to an alternate payee under a qualified
domestic relations order as those terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
(2) Exemptions under this section do not limit
items which may be claimed as exempt under Section
78-23-8.
1989

78-23-8. E x e m p t property u p to aggregate value
of $500 — E x e m p t i o n of implements,
professional books, tools, motor vehicle up to $1,500.
(1) An individual is entitled to exemption of the
following property up to an aggregate value of items
in each subparagraph of $500 :
(a) furnishings and appliances reasonably necessary for one household;
(b) animals, books, and musical instruments,
if reasonably held for the personal use of the individual or his dependents;
(c) an heirloom or other item of particular sentimental value to the individual.
(2) An individual is entitled to an exemption of implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of
the individual, all having an aggregate value not exceeding $1,500; and one motor vehicle having a value
not exceeding $1,500 where such motor vehicle is
used for the claimant's business or profession. Business or professional use of a motor vehicle does not
include transportation to and from a claimant's place
of work or business.
(3) This section does not affect property exempt under Section 78-23-5.
1981

78-23-11. Waiver of exemptions in favor of
unsecured creditor unenforceable.
A waiver of exemptions executed in favor of an
unsecured creditor before levy on an individual's
property is unenforceable.
1981

78-36-10.5

78-36-11
(b) Any personal property of the defendant
may be removed from the premises by the sheriff
<\r cATxstahla and transported tA a. suitable location for safe storage The sheriff or constable,
with the plaintiffs consent, may delegate responsibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must
store the personal property in a suitable place
and in a reasonable manner
(c) The personal property removed and stored
shall be inventoried by the sheriff or constable
who shall keep the original inventory and personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of
the inventory immediately after the personal
property is removed
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant
within 30 days of removal of personal property
from the premises, the sheriff or constable shall
promptly return all of the defendant's personal
property upon payment of the reasonable costs
incurred for its removal and storage
(b) The person storing the personal property
may sell the property remaining m storage at a
public sale if
(l) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the
premises, or
(n) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the removal and storage of the personal property
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing
the personal property shall mail to the defendant's last-known address a written notice of the
time and place of the sale
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he
may specify the order in which the personal property shall be sold, and only so much personal
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of
removal, storage, advertising, and conducting
the sale The remainder of the personal property,
if any, shall be released to the defendant If the
defendant is not present at the sale, the proceeds,
after deduction of the costs of removal, storage,
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid
to the plaintiff up to the amount of any judgment
the plaintiff obtained against the defendant Any
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are known If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus
shall be disposed of in accordance with Title 78,
Chapter 44, Uniform Unclaimed Property Act
(e) If the property belonging to a person who is
not a defendant is removed and stored in accor-

78-36-10 5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement — Disposition of personal
property — Hearing
(1) Each or^er of restitution shall
(a) dif e c t the defendant to vacate the premises, rei^ove his personal property, and restore
possession °f the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable,
(b) a d v l s e the defendant of the time limit set
by the c^urt for the defendant to vacate the premises, w h i c n shall be three business days following
service 0? the order unless the court determines
that a logger or shorter period is appropriate un
der the circumstances, and
(c) a d v l s e the defendant of his right to a hearing to contest the terms of the order of restitution
or the tfianner of its enforcement
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form
for the defendant to request a hearing shall be
served personally upon the defendant in accordance w'rth Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service may be made by mailing a copy of
the ord0 r ana * the form to the defendant's lastknown address and posting a copy of the order
and the f ° r m a t a conspicuous place on the premises
(b) Tfre d a t e °f service, the name, title, signature, and telephone number of the person serving
the orde r ana " the forrn shall be legibly endorsed
on the copy of the order and the form served on
the defendant
(c) Within t e n d a v s °f service, the person serving the order and the form shall file proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of
Civil procedure
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the
order within the time prescribed by the court, a
sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction
may enter the premises by force using the least
destructive means possible to remove the defendant

the property by delivering a written demand for
its release to the sheriff or constable If the claimant provides proper identification and evidence of
ownership, the sheriff or constable shall
promptly release the property at no cost to the
claimant
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the terms
of the order of restitution or the manner of its enforcement, the defendant or any person claiming to
own stored personal property may file a request for a
hearing The court shall set the matter for hearing
within ten days from the filing of the request, or as
soon thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice
of the hearing to the parties
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms nee
essary to implement this section
1994
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ORDER4 OF RESTITUTION

C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS
1255 E 2925 N
NORTH OGDEN UTAH 84414

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
PLAINTIFF (OWNER) C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS

ORDER OF
RESTITUTION
CASE NO.

VS
940008531 CV
DEFENDANTS (TENANTS) TINA JACKSON AND KELLY NORTON
830 24TH
OGDEN UTAH
MOTION
THE OWNER AND PLAINTIFF WENT TO TRIAL. OWNER HAS BEEN GRANTED
JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S NAMED ABOVE. THE OWNER'S RIGHT
TO IMMEDIATE RESTITUTION OF THE PREMISES AND POSSESSION OF
DEFENDANT(S) PROPERTY AT THE PREMISES WAS FOUND.
DATED THIS

/f

DAY OF

TAIL)

*

1995

ORDER OF RESTITUTION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) THAT POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AT LISTED FOR THE DEFENDANT
NAMED ABOVE (830 24TH ST) BE DELIVERED TO THE OWNER, AND THAT THE
RENTER(S), AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY FROM THE
RENTER(S) BE REMOVED FROM THESE PREMISES.
p^-Pc^Sjx^f^ ^
2) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT ALL '-JffiNSESW S) ' PERSONAL
PROPERTY BE LEFT AT THE PREMISES.
3) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT THE THREE DAY WAITING
PERIOD IS HEREBY WAIVED.
THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO EXECUTE THIS ORDER OF RESTITUTION IMMEDIATELY.
DATED THIS

<3D

DAY

A-4

1995

IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS,
D E C I S I O N
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
Case No.: 95 CV 8531
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan

TINA JACKSON & KELLY NORTON,
Defendant(s),

The Court has previously ruled that the contract provisions
regarding Defendant's property shall apply in the event of a
default on the contract, as is the case.
All previous orders shall remain in effect and Defendant's
Motion for Relief from Judgment is denied-r-^
DATED this

Chi

day of April, 1995r-}/

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Decision, postage prepaid, to:
C.E & BETTY BUTTERS
Plaintiff's
1255 E 2925 N
N Ogden, UT 844 04

dated t h i s

2

MARTIN BLAUSTEIN
Attorney for Defendant
550 24th Street, Suite 300
Ogden, UT 84401

day of A p r i l , 1995,

D epftrfc^petfur £ € 1 e r k
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*

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Martin S. Blaustein, #3993
Attorney for Defendants
550 - 24th Street, Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-9431
(WATS) 1-800-662-2538
(FAX) (801) 394-9434
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTER BUTTERS, *
*
Plaintiff,
*

AMENDED ORDER

*

v.

*
*

TINA JACKSON and
KELLY NORTON,

*
*

Judge: Pamela G. Heffernan

*

Defendants.

*

Civil No. 94-CV-853J

A hearing was held before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on
Defendants' Motion for Immediate Hearing on January 27, 1995 at the
hour of 9:00 a.m.

The Defendants appeared in person and was

represented by counsel, Martin S. Blaustein. The Plaintiff did not
appear in person, nor was represented by counsel.

Defendants'

counsel mailed a copy of the motion on January 23, 1995.

The

Plaintiff, according to the clerk of the court, called from Idahq,
claiming he did not receive the motion until January 26, 1995.
The court having heard the Defendants' concern amends the
prior order as follows:

A-6

C.E. Butters v. Jackson, et al.
Amended Order
Civil No. 94-CV-853
W

'7

tloPH'i:

CERTIFICATE OF -MAILING
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 0£DER
was mailed, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, thisr^' *!
day of January 1995, to the following:
C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, Pro se
Plaintiff
si
1255 E. 2925 N. //
North Ogden, UT/84414
//

Secretary
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LEASE
C. E. BUTTERS OF 12 55 E 2 92 5 N NORTH OGDEN, COUNTY OF WEBF.R,
STATE OF UTAH, HEREIN-AFTER REFERRED TO AS LANDLORD, HEREBY
REMISE, RELEASE AND LET TO f T ^ A C T A C X S O N J Q- tecUJf tQOKTVfiJ

HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS TENANT, THE PREMISES KNOWN AS

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD SAID PREMISES, UNTO THE TENANT, FROM THE
"ffiH D A Y OF IMAG,
, 19J&_ UNTIL THE 3^H DAY OF M/N
, 19_3S_, A TERM OF *l nO'^Hs 1) PflTTs •
TENANT COVENANTS AND AGREES TO PAY TO LANDLORD AS RENTAL FOR
SAID PREMISES, THE SUM OF j>HS"7b *QQ
Ecus. T H O U ^ P ^ Ft\ye Hi^ofceo <^€*^f fjvg
DOLLARS PAYABLE AS FOLLOWS.
$ ISO-OPfiufe2^P. iW^Uoo-oo r>^ A*& «arf/ 1 W , j^U .oo 6 J sE<>r 1*5 r. iqW fl^p

|
TENANT HAS PAID THE SUM OF ^JJJZZJSS
SECURITY DEPOSIT. IF
TENANT VACATES THE PREMISES ON OR BEFORE
MflV 1o TU
, 19 c\*>
NO REFUND SHALL BE GIVEN. IF THE TENANT, AFTER r^V ?t)fU
,
. 19*1*3 f WHEN VACATING THE PREMISES, LEAVES THE PREMISES CLEAN,
1
UNDAMAGED, AND DEBT FREE THE LANDLORD WILL REFUND 90% OF THE
SECURITY DEPOSIT.
TENANT FURTHER AGREES TO DELIVER UP SAID PREMISES TO LANDLORD
AT THE EXPIRATION OF SAID TERM IN AS GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION AS
WHEN THE SAME WERE ENTERED UPON BY TENANT, REASONABLE USE AND WEAR
THEREOF AND DAMAGE BY THE ELEMENTS EXCEPTED. TENANT WILL NOT LET
OR UNDERLET PREMISES.
TENANT FURTHER COVENANTS AND AGREES THAT IF SAID RENT REMAINS
UNPAID FOR THREE DAYS AFTER THE SAME SHALL BECOME DUE A SERVICE FEE
OF $15.00 SHALL BE PAID BY THE TENANT TO THE i LANDLORD. ALSO TENANT
AGREES THAT IF SAID MONIES ARE NOT PAID Wll'HIN THREE DAYS OF THE
DUE DATE OR IF TENANT IS IN DEFAULT IN ANY OF THE COVENANTS HEREIN
CONTAINED TO BE KEPT BY TENANT WI1JC1I ARE NOT CURED WITHIN THREE
DAYS FROM THE WRITTEN NOTICE BY LANDLORD, OR IF TENANT SHALL VACATE
SUCH PREMISES, LANDLORD MAY ELECT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR LEGAL PROCESS,
TO RE-ENTER AND TAKE POSSESSION OF SAID PREMISES AND EVERY AND ANY
PART THEREOF AND RE-LET THE SAME.
LANDLORD MAY TERMINATE THIS LEASE WITH 10 DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE
TO TENANT FOR ANY REASON.
LANDLORD MAY INSPECT THE PREMISES FOR DAMAGE, CLEANLINESS AND
REPAIRS AT ALL REASONABLE TIMES. ALSO LANDLORD SHALL SPECIFICALLY
BE ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE PREMISES ON THE 1ST AND 151H OF EACH
MONTH SOMETIME BETWEEN 7:00 AM AND 10:00 PM.
TENANT SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING THEIR OWN ELECTRICAL
POWER AND GAS BILLS. TENANT WILL SIGN UP FOR ALL UTILITIES PRIOR
TO MOVING INTO PREMISES. (BRING RECEIPTS FOR KEYS. T^ftr^ ? Ptt S
^Aree- —

f£N>ftr^r to PAYftcnxAS^Otffl- Of VGQO^-zzr PjtftZG

X^' — uSftSP ^ T A ^ T pflTb ^fy\£cT

TO ?Qjeyj£ovKs t £ ^ ^ 3

yWScOGj

vJfli^-rjcJG go v*:£r<\£,

TENANT SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSSES RESULTING FROM
NEGLIGENCE OR MISCONDUCT OF HIMSELF, HIS EMPLOYEES OR INVITEES.
FURNITURE, FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF TENANT MAY NOT BE
REMOVED FROM THE PREMISES UNTIL RENT OR OTHER CHARGES ARE FULLY
PAID.
NO PETS ALLOWED.
IN CASE OF FAILURE TO FAITHFULLY PERFORM ' THE TERMS AND
COVENANTS HEREIN SET FORTH, THE DEFAULTING PARTY SHALL PAY ALL
COSTS EXPENSES, AND REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES RESULTING FROM THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY RIGHT ARISING OUT OF SUCH
BREACH.
TENAJHMS) AGRI^E TO h\/L OF THE ABOVE TERMS AND COVENANTS.

*

WITNESS

^C^^^r^

A^9

%

C.E. Butters v. Jackson, et al.
Amended Order
C i v i l No. 94-CV-853
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*

D

:

' - ^ i *j I.
O R D E R

1.

?

"r " / - '

.. ^

The children's prescriptive medication shall be promptly

returned to Defendants•
2.

The children's clothing, shall be promptly returned.

This shall include the children's bedding, blankets, pillows and
sheets.
3.

The

children's

promptly returned.

school

books

and materials

shall

be

This includes all materials related to the

children's education.
4.
directory

The Defendants or Defendants' counsel shall communicate
with

the

Plaintiff

transfer the above property.

regarding

a

reasonable

time

to

The Plaintiff shall supervise and be

present during this process.
5.

All other aspects of the prior order shall remain the

same.
DATED this

day of

^
BY THE COUKT^)

1995.
"*

PAMELA.Of. HEFFERNAN
Circuit: Cdurt Judge
Date entered:

2

